2012/01 双月刊

# 世界宗教文化

全国中文核心期刊 总第73期
中文社会科学引文索引（CSSCI）来源期刊

The World Religious Cultures

## 特 稿

◎ 宗教生态论
◎ 西方马克思主义宗教论说的六个问题领域
◎ Smash Temples, Burn Books

## 专家论坛 宗教慈善

◎ 宗教与中国现代慈善转型
◎ 宗教与慈善
◎ 宗教界开展公益慈善事业问题研究
◎ “另类的尴尬”与“玻璃口袋”

2012年 第1期
CONTENTS 目录

## 特稿

宗教生态论 …… 牟钟鉴（001）
西方马克思主义宗教论说的六个问题领域 …… 杨慧林（011）
Smash Temples, Burn Books: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China …… Peter van der Veer（017）
毁庙焚书——中印世俗化运动比较（中文摘要）…… 郁　丹（Dan Smyer Yu）（026）

## 理论前沿

宗教和平学刍议 …… 孙亦平（027）
社会学视野下宗教定义的讨论 …… 邢婷婷（033）

## 专家论坛　宗教慈善

宗教与中国现代慈善转型——兼论慈悲、宽容、专业奉献及养成教育的价值 …… 王振耀（038）
宗教与慈善——从同一个站台出发的列车或走向同一站点的不同交通工具？ …… 刘培峰（044）
宗教界开展公益慈善事业问题研究 …… 董　栋（047）
“另类的尴尬”与“玻璃口袋”——当代宗教慈善公益的“中国式困境” …… 郑筱筠（052）

## 国际视野　东南亚伊斯兰教研究

东南亚清真寺建筑中的多元文化元素研究 …… 吴杰伟（059）
泰国北部华人穆斯林身份认同的变化 …… 合富祥　冯　瑜（065）
印尼华裔穆斯林：一个未完成的反歧视项目 …… Akh Muzakki　著　王　艳　翻译（069）

## 深度解读

伊斯兰教的新兴宗教运动——赛莱菲耶 …… 杨桂萍　编译（077）

## 学术专题　宗教艺术

风帽地藏像的由来与演进 …… 张　总（083）
简析临朐白龙寺建筑基址的结构年代与性质 …… 宫德杰（089）
试从禅宗的角度审视古典书法 …… 聂　清（095）
彩绘唐卡与汉地传统工笔重彩的差异简析 …… 张小燕（099）

## 实证调研

美国最大的福州人教会 …… 何绵山（104）

## 学海扬帆

当代中国佛教《维摩诘经》的研究现状与问题 …… 韩国茹（108）

2012年 第1期
CONTENTS目录


## Special Contributions

On Religious Ecology ····· Mou Zhongjian ( 001 )

Six Problems in the Religious Discourse of Western Marxism ····· Yang Huilin ( 011 )

Smash Temples, Burn Books: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China ····· Peter van der Veer ( 017 )

Chinese Abstract ····· Dan Smyer Yu ( 026 )

## Theoretical Forefront

A Tentative Discussion on Theories of Religious Peace ····· Sun Yiping ( 027 )

A Discussion on the Definition of Religion with a Sociological Perspective ····· Xing Tingting ( 033 )

## Specialist Forum – Religious Charity

Religion and the Modern Transformation of Charity in China: Also on the Value of Compassion, Tolerance, Specialized Dedication and Formative Education ····· Wang Zhenyao ( 038 )

Religion and Charity: Trains Starting from the Same Platform or Different Vehicles Heading toward the Same Station? ····· Liu Peifeng ( 044 )

A Study on Religious Groups' Involvement in Public Services and Charitable Works ····· Dong Dong ( 047 )

An "Odd Embarassment" and the "Glass Pocket": On the "Chinese Dilemma" of Religious Charitable Works ····· Zheng Xiaoyun ( 052 )

## International Perspective – Islam in Southeast Asia

On the Multi-Cultural Elements of Mosque Architecture in Southeast Asia ····· Wu Jiewei ( 059 )

Changes in Self-Identification of the Chinese Muslims in Northern Thailand ····· He Fuxiang, Feng Yu ( 065 )

Chinese Muslims in Indonesia: an Unfinished Anti-Prejudice Project ····· Translation by Wang Yan ( 069 )

## In-Depth Reading

An Islamic New Religious Movement: the Salafiyyah ····· Translation Editor by Yang Guiping ( 077 )

## Academic Specials – Religious Arts

The Origin and Development of the Ti-tsang Bodhisattva's Statue with a Wind Cap ····· Zhang Zong ( 083 )

An Analyse of the Structural Time and Nature of the Architectural Basis of the Bailong Temple in Linqu ····· Gong Dejie ( 089 )

On Ancient Chinese Collicraphy from the Perspective of Chan ····· Nie Qing ( 095 )

A Brief Analyse of the Difference between Coloured Drawings of Tangka and Traditional Chinese Rich Colour Realistic Painting ····· Zhang Xiaoyan ( 099 )

## Positivist Studies

The Largest Fuzhou Peopls's Church in the United States ····· He Mianshan ( 104 )

## Academic Adventures

Studies on the Vimalakirti Sutra by Today's Chinese Buddhists: Present State and Problems ····· Han Guoru ( 108 )

# Smash Temples, Burn Books：

## Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China

Peter van der Veer ⊙

Abstract: The paper discusses problems inherent in the secularist project, by an examination of secularisms in India and China. Different motives, historical backgrounds, political situations and cultural considerations etc. have led to different paths and results in the two countries secularization efforts in modern times, the study of which will further our understanding of the secularist project.

Key Words: Secularist Project India China Secularism

About the Author: Peter van der Veer,Director/Professor of Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity ,Gottingen, Germany.

## 1. Introduction

Much sociological attention and imagination has gone into first the development of the secularization-thesis and more recently into its dismantling. Jose Casanova has been in the forefront of this dismantling with his important book *Public Religions*.[①] He has argued that the three propositions of the secularization thesis, namely the decline of religious beliefs, the privatization of religion, and the differentiation of secular spheres and their emancipation from religion should be looked at separately in a comparative analysis. He comes to the conclusion that comparative historical analysis allows one to get away from the dominant stereotypes about the US and Europe and to open a space for further sociological inquiry into multiple patterns of fusion and differentiation of the religious and the secular across societies and religions. This means the moving away from teleological understandings of modernization. Or perhaps better, it means a questioning of that telos by recognizing its multiplicity and its contradictions. Casanova's intervention can be understood as building on the Weberian project of comparative and historical sociology, but going beyond it by avoiding to reduce civilizations to essences that can be compared and by avoiding a Hegelian evaluation in terms of "lack" or "deficit" in the world-historical process of modernization and rationalization. Eisenstadt's proposal to speak about multiple modernities similarly creates space for such a post-Weberian project, but the question has to be asked what the role of secularity and secularism is in the production of these multiple modernities.[②]

My attempt here to examine secularism in India and China in a comparative historical analysis accepts this post-Weberian perspective, but I want to make a few observations. The first is that the project of European

① Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

② Shmuel Eisenstadt, ed., *Multiple Modernities*, Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

modernity should be understood as part of what I have called "interactional history".[①] That is to say that the project of modernity with all its revolutionary ideas of nation, equality, citizenship, democracy, rights is developed not only in Atlantic interactions between the US and Europe but also in interactions with Asian and African societies that are coming within the orbit of imperial expansion. Instead of the oft-assumed *universalism* of the Enlightenment I would propose to look at the *universalization* of ideas that emerge from a history of interactions. Enlightened notions of rationality and progress are not simply invented in Europe and accepted elsewhere, but are both produced and universally spread in the expansion of European power. This entails a close attention to the pathways of imperial universalization. Examining secularism in India and China uncovers some of the peculiarities of this universalization by showing how it is inserted in different historical trajectories in these societies.

The second is that with all the attention to secularization as a historical *process* there is not enough attention to secularism as historical *project*. Casanova has in his recent writings rightly drawn attention to the importance in Europe of secularism as an ideological critique of religion, carried out by a number of social movements.[②] Secularism as an ideology offers a teleology of religious decline and can function as a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is important to examine the role of intellectuals in furthering this understanding of history, but also their relation to sources of power: state apparatuses and social movements. Secularism is a forceful ideology when carried by political movements that capture both the imagination and the means to mobilize social energies. It is important to attend to the utopian and indeed religious elements in secularist projects in order to understand why many of these movements seem to tap into traditional and modern sources of witchcraft, millenarianism and charisma. Much of this remains outside of the framework of discussions of secularization, but the cases of India and China show us how essential this is for understanding the dynamics of religion and the secular.

Thirdly, I would like to point out that the religious and the secular are produced simultaneously and in mutual interaction. As many scholars have been arguing, religion as a universal category is a modern construction with a genealogy in universalist Deism and in 16th and 17th century European expansion.[③] One needs therefore to analyze how the categories of "religion", "magic" and "world religion" are universalized. This is also true for the category of the secular that has a genealogy in Church-World relations in European history but is transformed in modernity both in Europe and elsewhere.

To analyze Indian and Chinese secularism one has to start not with the interactions between India and China which are very few and relatively insignificant in the modern period, but with their interactions with Europe and especially Britain. It is imperialism that forces Indians and Chinese to interpret their traditions in terms of the category of "religion" and its opposition to "the secular". While there are multiple histories involved here it is the imperial context that produces a remarkably similar trajectory that essentializes Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Daoism, and even Confucianism into comparable entities, subjects of the new, secular discipline of Comparative Religion or Science of Religion that attempts to emancipate itself from Christian theology. One also has to look carefully at ways in which European notions of science and its

① Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters; Nation and Religion in India and Britain*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
② Jose Casanova, "Religion, Secular Identities, and European Integration," *Transit* 27, 2004.
③ Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2004.

opposite, of progress and backwardness capture the imagination of Indian and Chinese intellectuals and how this relates to the creation of the modern state. In the following I will first deal with secularism in China, then with secularism in India in order to show what kind of problems secularist projects attempt to address and what kind of violence their interventions entail.

## 2. Secularism in China

"Smash temples, build schools" (毁庙办学 *huimiao, banxue*) is a particularly telling slogan that was used in a campaign against temple cults and religious specialists during reforms in late Qing at the end of the 19th century. According to the reformists, led by Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and to an extent supported by the emperor, China had to modernize quickly and this had to be done by promoting education and by getting rid of religious superstition. These two elements belonged together, since education should train people in modern, rational thought while superstition and magical thought should be discouraged. Before the Communist victory in 1949 a number of campaigns, first in late imperial China and afterwards in the Republic, destroyed or "secularized", according to one estimate, half of a million existing temples.[①] What the Communists did after 1949 was, to a very great extent, a continuation of these campaigns. While one might have expected that the nationalists in Taiwan with their Confucian nationalism would have had a fundamentally different policy towards religion than the Communists, the opposite is in fact the case. Till the late 1960s the nationalists kept religious activities under a very tight control. All these campaigns against religion should have produced a secular China, but the contrary is true. In Taiwan religious activities are all over the place and with the loosening of the tight controls over religion in the PRC we see religious activity flourishing everywhere. This paradox can be understood by closely examining the nature of these secularist campaigns.

Secularism as an ideology and as a practice in China is in the first place an anti-clericalism. Anti-clericalism has deep roots in Chinese history, but at the end of the 19th century it gained both the attention of the popular media and of intellectuals who grappled with modern, Western ideas. Intellectuals, like Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Zhang Binglin (1869-1936), and Chen Yinque (1890-1969) separated Buddhism and Taoism from their clerical roots and made them into national moralities that could serve the modernization of China. Buddhist leaders such as Taixu (1890-1947) and Daoist modernists like Chen Yingning (1880-1969) made great efforts to bring their religions under the rubric of secular nationalism. The popular press was also not opposed to religion as such, but to Buddhist and Daoist clerics who were described not only as ignorant buffoons, but also as criminals, drunkards, gluttons, and, foremost, as sexually debauched. Temples and monasteries were described in the emergent press in the Late Qing period as dungeons for sexual debauchery, places of great pornographic potentiality. Clerics are portrayed in stories as visiting houses of pleasure. The main theme here is in fact that monastic celibacy and techniques of self-improvement are a *disguise* for a lawless, unbridled sexuality.[②] This theme of sexual scandal is certainly crucial in the emergence of the popular press in the 19th century everywhere, but the Chinese focus on clerics recalls especially the pornography that was printed in the Netherlands but distributed in revolutionary circles in France in the decades before the

① Vincent Goossaert, "The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?," *Journal of Asian Studies* 65, no. 2, 2006, pp.307–336.

② Vincent Goossaert, " L'anti–clericalisme en Chine," *Extreme–Orient/Extreme–Occident* 24, 2002.

French revolution. Here we see a genealogy of *laicite* in the underbelly of the Enlightenment that connects religion with sexuality in ways that are never made explicit, but which are, in my view, also behind the social energy in anti-Islamic gestures today in France.

Clerics in China were also seen as dangerously violent, since their ascetic disciplines and martial arts that inflict violence on their own bodies can be turned against others for crimes of rebellious purposes. Obviously, this theme gained prominence in the late 19th century during the failed Boxer rebellion. Clerics were able to connect to secret societies that threatened the state monopoly of violence. They combined fighting techniques with magic that made the believers think they were invincible and thus extremely dangerous. The failure of the Boxer rebellion, however, showed Chinese intellectuals that there was no future in using magical means to defeat the imperial powers. Again, the theme of *delusion* and *disguise* comes up here with the notion that the illiterate masses are led into meaningless and ultimately fruitless violence by cunning clerics.

Besides a form of anticlericalism Chinese secularism is a form of scientism and rationalism. From a 19th century enlightened and evolutionary perspective it pitches scientific rationality against magical superstition. Secularism is thus a battle against the misconceptions of natural processes that keeps the illiterate masses in the dark and in the clutches of feudal rulers and clerics. The term for superstition （迷信 mixin) comes from Japanese as many other terms that are employed in the discourse of modernity, like indeed the term "religion" （宗教 zongjiao) itself. In using these neologisms it makes a distinction between religion that contributes to the morality of the state and superstition that is detrimental to modern progress. These views are shared by intellectuals of all persuasions, including the nationalists and the communists, but also by many reformist religious thinkers. This is both a discursive and an institutional shift as an aspect of the transition from the ancient regime of the Qing empire to the modern Republic. The traditional system of three teachings (sanjiao), Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist, in which Confucian state ritual defined the framework for the other two was transformed in the Republic by the notion that there were five acceptable world religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. Confucianism was kept outside of this arrangement, because it was considered to be both national instead of global and in essence secular rather than religious. Confucian intellectuals did try to turn it into a secular civil religion, but this met with little success outside of the nationalist elite. These religions that are officially recognized till today are being organized along the models of Christianity in nation-wide associations that are ultimately controlled by the state. What remains outside of this is what is often called popular belief（民间信仰 minjian xinyang), namely all those cults that are in fact closely connected to Buddhist, and Daoist ideas and practices but are not controlled by the traditional Buddhist or Daoist orders or by the modern state-engineered associations. Moreover, many of the Buddhist and Daoist local cults are hard to transform into nation-wide associations. Especially Taoism had been deeply intertwined with local cults or as is sometimes said, Taoism is "the written tradition of local cults". ① The opposition between officially approved religion and local forms of superstition gives authorities a great space for controlling and repressing all kinds of religious expressions.

Anticlericalism and scientism together were deeply connected to Western, enlightened ideas about progress, in which magic had to be replaced by scientific rationality and by moral religion as basis of national identity. Major currents of western thought, like social Darwinism, neo-Kantianism, and Marxism were

① Kristofer Schipper, *The Daoist Body*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p.6.

absorbed in China. Not only prescriptive thought about society came to stand in the light of rationality, but also descriptive social science, such as sociology and anthropology lost their ability to describe the effects of these ideologies on society since they could not distance themselves from them. Intellectuals played an important role in the secularist projects of nationalizing and rationalizing religion and, crucially, they were part and parcel of large-scale state interventions to produce a modern, national identity. While Buddhism and Taoism were to some extent sources for the creation of national religion, Confucianism was itself being considered as already both national and rational. The attempts to transform Confucian traditions into a civil, national religion were extremely interesting as a form of social engineering, but ultimately failed, largely because Confucian teachings could encompass Daoist and Buddhist teachings but not the social energy that local Daoist and Buddhist cults could mobilize.

One of the great puzzles of China today is not that it proves the secularization thesis wrong, but that despite a century of secularism religion has not been destroyed. In fact we see everywhere in China a more open performance of religious rituals. This raises a number of issues. First of all, if the secular and the religious are produced simultaneously what has happened to the religious under secularist attack? What is the nature of Chinese religion today? Has it been hiding and does it now come out of the closet and what does that mean? Secondly, how can we explain that secularism has not been able to fulfill its world-historical task? Thirdly, what may be the future of secularism in China under the current conditions of religious expansion?

Firstly, then, what is the nature of Chinese religion and secularity today? On the one hand we find a general acceptance in China of the idea that religion is not important to the Chinese, that the Chinese have always been rational and secular, and with modernization even more so. This view is not only prevalent among intellectuals, but is also more generally held. And on the other hand, there is a widespread interest in religious practices, in visiting shrines especially during tourist trips, in religious forms of healing. Both in cities and in the countryside communities are rebuilding their temples and have started in awkward negotations with the authorities to perform their ceremonies again. Religious activity seems to be embedded in a fully secular life, in which job insecurities, health and desire for success and profit create a demand for divine support. With the decline of the "iron rice bowl" of the state this demand has only increased. The same intellectuals who deny the importance of religion pray for their family's welfare wherever they can. The chain of memory, to use Hervieu-Leger's term, however, seems to have been broken and needs to be patched up. [①] In general people who engage in ritual (rather than theology or philosophy) are not very knowledgeable about them but in China this is quite extreme. This is enhanced by the fact that the clergy has been largely exterminated or so much brought under control of the Party that they have lost their liturgical bearings. This situation in itself gives a lot of space for new religious movements in which lay people play an important role, like the many qigong movements.

Secondly, how do we explain the failure of a century of systematic destruction of Chinese religious life? One answer lies in the millenarian nature of Maoism itself. The Party absorbed quite a lot of the social energy that is available in religious movements. Mass mobilization (群众运动 qunzhong yundong) for the transformation of self and society has a central place both in Chinese religion and in Maoism. Studying and especially reciting Mao's writings again recall religious chanting. The finding and expelling of class enemies and traitors follow quite precisely the trappings of Chinese witchcraft beliefs and exorcism, even in the giving of black hoods as symbols

① Daniele Hervieu-Leger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2000.

of evil to the accused. [①] The practice of public confession likewise continues religious practice.

Thirdly, what is the future of secularism in China? As I already indicated secularity is well established in China in daily life as well as in people's self-understanding. Secularism is also certainly still the frame in which clerics have to operate. The Buddhist and Daoist associations are still largely controlled by the state.

## 3. Secularism in India

At first sight it may look as if Chinese and Indian secularisms are totally different, since in China secularism is anti-religious, while in India secularism is a form of state non-interference in religion. Such a view is not untrue, but it is instructive to compare Chinese and Indian secularisms. Secularism in India has a number of elements in common with Chinese secularism, although the meaning of these elements is structurally altered by the nature of the caste system and of inter-ethnic and inter-communal relations. In Hinduism Brahmans are the most important clerics but anti-clericalism has deep roots in Brahmanical thought. Priests who perform a religious service to the community and are paid for that in gifts are looked down upon by Brahmans who devote themselves to studying the Vedas. This strand of anti-clericalism fuels many of the reforms of the large temples in South India, in which powerful middle-class laymen demand that ignorant priests are re-educated to learn Sanskrit and ritual performances. More generally the Brahman caste as a whole has come under attack in the 19th and 20th century with the rise of explicitly secularist movements, especially in South and West-India. Jyotirao Phule (1827-1890) began a movement in Maharashtra against the alleged exploitation of low castes by Brahmans. E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker (1879-1973), also known as Periyar, founded a social respect movement in Tamil Nadu that became the basis of an anti-Brahman Tamil nationalism. He connected his anti-clericalism with a theatrical atheism that was expressed in publicly burning sacred books, such as the Sanskrit Ramayana. The sources of this anti-clericalism that evolved in the case of Periyar in atheism were two-fold: Christian missionaries had for a long time vilified Brahman priests and their rapacity and ignorance in their project to convert especially tribals and low castes away from Hinduism. This rhetoric is taken over by the anti-Brahman movements. It is combined with racial and linguistic theories, developed by orientalist scholars like Friedrich Max Muller, which distinguish the Aryan invaders from the indigenous low castes. Brahmans are then shown to be really different from, say, the (South Indian) Dravidians and are portrayed as exploiting the indigenous peoples. We can already see that Indian anti-clericalism is decidedly different from Chinese anti-clericalism because of the connection between caste and religion. It is the Brahman caste that comes under attack and Brahman priests are taken to be the symbols of that caste. On the other hand, both in China and in India the main issue is the introduction of modern egalitarianism in a hierarchical society and thus the connection between feudalism and religion.

We also find scientism and rationalism in India as an element of secularism as we did in the Chinese case. However, already in the 19th century Indian intellectuals do not emphasize the opposition between science and religion, but instead emphasize the scientific nature of indigenous traditions. Secularist attacks on traditional religion are rare, though attempts to purify religion from so-called superstition and to show the scientific foundations of religion are taken up by reformers in a number of proto-nationalist and nationalist movements.

---

① Barend ter Haar, *Telling Stories: Witchcraft and Scapegoating in Chinese History*, Leiden, Brill, 2006.

Rational religion, as a major current in these reform movements, offered a home to intellectuals who wanted to reflect on developments in science from Hindu traditions. A good example is J.C. Bose (1853-1937), a renowned physicist and plant physiologist, whose work on electrical waves and on plant consciousness was animated by attempts to understand the unity of nature from the perspective of the Hindu philosophical school of Advaita Vedanta, in which Bengali intellectuals had been trained.[①] The social network formed by such scientists and Hindu reformers like Swami Vivekananda shows how the development of scientific and religious thought was interwoven. Philosophers like Henri Bergson and Aurobindo embraced Bose's vitalistic science eagerly. While Chinese intellectuals also found rationality and science in some religious traditions, especially in the field of medicine, there is a much stronger sense than in India that progress can only be made by separating science from magic and by destroying magic.

Secularism in India emerges in the context of a secular colonial state that is professedly neutral towards religious divisions in society. The British in India are deeply concerned with projecting an image of transcendent neutrality. At least partially they were successful in doing this, since Indians today often see *dharma-nirapeksata*, the indigenous term indicating the neutrality of the state as a distinctive character of Indian civilization rather than a colonial invention. Sometimes, for example by Gandhi, this neutrality is more positively interpreted as *dharmasamabhava*, the equal flourishing of religion under the state's neutrality. After the Mutiny of 1857 the British were afraid to be seen interfering with the religious activities and sensibilities of their Indian subjects. This implies that the colonial state had to hide its modernizing and secularizing interventions in society under rhetoric of neutrality because it derived its legitimacy not from India but from a democratic process in Britain. This neutrality, however, is interpreted by Indian nationalists as forms of divide-and-rule, especially in the area of Hindu-Muslim relations. The state is thus condemned as pseudo-secular, an argument that is later revived by Hindu nationalists against the post-colonial government. The post-colonial state derives its legitimacy from democratic elections in India and is thus even less able than its predecessor, the colonial state, to hide its interventions in society and religion, such as the Temple Entry Acts and the abolition of untouchability, under the cloak of neutrality.

Since the colonial state is secular in the sense of being neutral towards religion this gives wide scope to connecting religion with anti-colonial nationalism. Anti-colonial nationalism in India draws deeply from religious sources, both ideologically and organizationally. In earlier work I have made a distinction between a moderate, pluralist vision of the Indian nation and a radical vision that wants to promote a singular religion as the core of national identity.[②] The pluralist vision is the ideological foundation of India as a secular state as distinguished from the radical vision of Muslims separatists that was the foundation of Pakistan as a "homeland for Muslims" as well as from the radical vision of Hindu nationalists who fight for a Hindu India. The moderate vision has been always part of the secular ideology of the Congress party, a party that ruled India for the larger part of post-independence history.

Congress found itself confronted with two major problems. First of all, Hindu-Muslim antagonism was a major threat to the creation of an Indian nation. This problem became more and more crucial in the struggle for Independence and secularism was conceived as the answer to it. Secondly, Indian society was marked by one

---

① Gyan Prakash, *Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India*, Princeton,NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999.

② Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism. Hindus and Muslims in India*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

of the most pervasive systems of inequality in the world that was religiously sanctioned by Hindu traditions. Again, secularism was conceived as an answer to this. While state interventions were recognized as crucial to the transformation of Indian society into a modern nation, Congress leaders agreed that large-scale violence should be avoided. A major argument in developing Indian secularism was made by Gandhi when he made a plea for non-violence and tolerance. However, except for a brief period, Gandhi was not officially a member of Congress leadership, but a moral exemplar outside of party politics. Gandhi's moral example could be an element in producing secular tolerance, but such an example is not enough for the daily business of regulating social life. After Independence the modern state could not refrain from intervening in society.

Critics of Congress secularism today, such as T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy, have understood the rise of communalism in India as a backlash against a long-term campaign of an interventionist state to impose secularism on a fundamentally religious society. ① While their emphasis on state power is correct their criticism of Nehru's Congress seems fundamentally mistaken. Nehru's position was that the state should not attempt to make India a mono-cultural society in which the minorities would feel alienated. Pragmatically Congress adopted the role of neutral arbiter of religious difference, just as colonial administrators had done. Separate civil codes for Hindus and Muslims that had developed in the colonial period were continued in secular India. Potential sources of violent conflict, such as the disputed site of Babar's Mosque in Ayodhya, had to be controlled and managed, rather than fundamentally solved. In fact it is this policy to which the BJP, A Hindu nationalist party, today objects. It does not claim that an anti-religious secularism has dominated Indian society, but that it has been a pseudo-secularism that has given religious minorities special benefits in order to get their votes. So, it does not argue that secularists had launched an attack on the religious traditions of Indian society, but that it had left minority traditions intact for electoral reasons. The BJP claims to be secular, but it has launched campaigns to destroy mosques that had been built on Hindu sites and rebuilt Hindu temples, arguing that the majority religion on which the nation is built is Hinduism and that the only traditions that had to be dealt with by the secular state were those of the (Muslim and Christian) minorities. Nehru's cautious but sometimes ambivalent policies towards multiculturalism and the ways they came to be challenged in the 1970s and 1990s show the importance of the definition of state secularism.

The limitations of Congress secularism that tries to avoid violence in its interventions in society are clear from the failure to get rid of untouchability and caste hierarchies. Ambedkar, one of the great Untouchable leaders of Congress and architect of India's secular constitution, came to the conclusion that the secular, liberal state could not solve the problems of untouchability that were deeply embedded in codes of honor and respect. While early in his career he demonstrated his stance against Hinduism by burning Hindu Law Books in public, at the end of his life he decided to convert to Buddhism in order to escape from the Hindu caste system. ② In a very original manner he came to grips with the dualism of redistribution (class) and recognition (caste). His conversion shows that religious conversion can address these issues sometimes better than conversion to secular ideologies like socialism or liberalism.

---

① T. N Madan, *Modern myths, locked minds. Secularism and fundamentalism in India*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1997. Ashis Nandy, "An Anti-Secularist Manifesto," *India International Quarterly* 22, no. 1, 1995, pp.35–64.

② Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside the Fold*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999.

## 4. Conclusion

Secularisms in India and China are a product of the Imperial Encounter. Certainly, there are pre-colonial traditions of anti-clericalism and anti-superstition in India and China. These do not disappear, but they are transformed by the imperial encounter. That encounter itself is crucial and it is fundamentally different in India and China. In India the colonial state has to perform a certain secular neutrality towards religion because of its colonial nature. It avoids an outright attack on the beliefs and customs of the natives, while masking its fundamental interventions in society by cloaking it in neutrality. In China reformers within the Qing dynasty and later in the Republic do not have to perform this neutrality while introducing Western notions and enforcing them in society. Chinese reformers can therefore call for the destruction of temples, whereas Indian reformers call for open access to temples for untouchables in Temple Entry Agitation and burn books to challenge Brahman hegemony. In India religion becomes the basis of resistance to the colonial state and it has to be reformed and modernized in order to make it part of the morality of the modern state. The Indian discussion then is primarily about reforming Indian traditions, not about destroying them. The Indian reformers who want to destroy Hinduism as a form of oppression are certainly important but they do not dominate the nationalist movement. In fact their political position derives precisely from their social marginality as Untouchables as in the case of Ambedkar or from their regional marginality as in the case of the Tamil leader Periyar. They may burn sacred texts but certainly not temples.

Secondly, the secularisms found in India and China are emancipatory projects and by their very nature they are violent. The transition to modernity is obviously violent, it does violence to traditional arrangements and therefore the relation of secularism to violence is crucial. The secular mobilization of social energies in China is incredibly violent, discursively and practically. The Chinese secular utopia is strikingly millenarian and magical and thus reintroduces the traditional elements that it wants to eradicate but in another configuration. The mobilization of social energies in India is also violent, but it is not secularism that produces anti-religious violence. On the contrary, Indian secularism tries to stem the violence between religious communities. The secular utopia, as is clearest in Gandhi's campaigns, is thus one of the peaceful co-existence of equal religions within a neutral state. Non-violence is therefore the centre of Gandhi's attempts to create a secular India. It is not only the emancipation from the colonial oppressor that has to be non-violent, but even more the emancipation from inequality and communal opposition that has to be non-violent.

Thirdly, the Chinese and Indian cases show us that secularism is not simply anti-religious in these societies, although there are anti-religious elements in it, but that it simultaneously attempts to transform religions into moral sources of citizenship and national belonging. The masses have to be re-educated to realize their emancipatory potential and religions can be used as state apparatuses to perform this re-education. One does not have to smash temples to build schools; one can also use temples to educate the people. In the regime of secularism religions are nationalized and modernized. While religion is an important element in the production of these imaginaries, it can never be entirely contained by the secularist frame. It may produce linkages outside of the nation-state as world-religions do; it may produce alternative visions of the moral state and thus become dangerous for secularist control as in millenarian movements that have emerged in China after the demise of Maoism. Precisely because secularism is a project and not a process it is bound to be incomplete and is bound to produce contradictions that it itself cannot explain.

# 毁庙焚书——中印世俗化运动比较

⊙ 郁　丹（Dan Smyer Yu）

**编译者简介：**郁丹(Dan Smyer Yu)，博士，德国马普宗教与民族多元研究所高级研究员兼中国研究负责人。

范彼德（Peter van der Veer）教授是当代著名宗教学家之一。此文是范先生目前对中国和印度的现代性和宗教世俗化的比较研究成果之一，他的观点是：中国和印度作为东方文明大国在同时代受到了欧洲列强尤其是英国殖民主义的冲击；两国都源于西欧的现代思潮进行自身文化和社会制度的改革与转型。但是，一个多世纪后，现代性在两个文明古国的本土化过程和文化效应显然有极大的不同。范彼德将宗教世俗化和国家世俗主义作为个案，剖析现代性在两个亚洲大国产生的文化、社会、政治场景和意义。首先在理论上，他指出现代性不是单一的。现代性应该是一个复数词，因为从全球历史和当下的视角看，它具有互动性、交融型、复合性及区域文化多样性。按范彼德的话来说，现代性的历史是一部“互动史”而不是一部西欧启蒙思潮单向性输出。“互动”不仅是指欧洲与其他地区的互动，更是涵盖欧洲以外地区之间的互动。在这样的历史场景里，他提出世俗主义在中国和印度不只是一个“过程（process）”而是各自的一个“运动（project）”。说的直接些，“运动”指的是国家与其文化精英对国家制度和国民性与宗教的重新定位。从文化和政治意识上讲，“运动”指的是有意识地、被动地吸收现代性的思潮和实践。换言之，世俗主义作为“运动”是国家与其政治精英们的政治改良或革命行为，其目的是重组宗教的公共文化空间。范彼德认为，在中国，世俗主义明显地、直接地反对并攻击宗教在现代社会中的国民文化和政治合理性。在他的历史分析里，我们看到宗教教义的理性部分大多已经被非理性的盲目崇拜所替代。另外更值得注意的是，世俗主义思潮和实践与当时中国知识精英崇尚科学和科技是分不开的。中国的贫困、落后及对欧洲列强的无奈的根源被归结于知识精英们所称的迷信：涵盖道教、佛教及民间宗教。值得提醒的是，范先生指出当时的“毁庙焚书”运动不是中国的世俗主义的终极目标，而是一个建立一个新国家秩序的工程。也就是说，通过“毁庙焚书”来腾出思想和公共空间来迎接一个以科学为主体的进步社会和一个崭新的国家认同。这样的世俗主义表述与其在同时代印度的表述是不同的。在殖民化的场景下，印度当时是被英国统治。殖民政府当然也在印度社会里注入世俗化和世俗主义的思想，但是在表面上维持了自称为对宗教的中性、中立的立场，或是“不干涉”政策。然而，世俗主义和宗教世俗化还是透入到印度社会里。其首要反响表现在印度的种姓制度在印度的知识精英的眼里的确成了传统印度教神职人员的剥削工具。范彼德提到婆罗门神职人员利用自己宗教权威从低种姓人群获取钱财，他指出当时的印度知识精英大多来自中产阶级和上层种姓家庭，他们为了自己民族独立和自由及建立一个现代新印度而吸收现代思潮。与中国不同的是，世俗主义在当时的印度不是整体性地攻击宗教，而是去认识印度教里具有科学性的元素。也就是说，印度教里可以与现代思想相沟通的成分成了当时印度知识精英所称的“理性宗教（rational religion）”。同时，印度教的神职人员也受到公众压力以至于重新认知自己教义里理性元素和现代价值观类同的内容，比如“平等”、“自由”及“解放”。从中国和印度的个案里，范彼德提出至关重要的观点是世俗主义不是像卡萨诺瓦（Jose Casanova）所指的宗教衰败，而是指宗教的转型、社会空间的改变、民族国家政治里的作用及个人灵性生活地位中的升级。最后，从民族志的视角，范彼德强调21世纪的中国宗教重新在公民生活中有了重要的位置，而在印度，宗教在与国家认同和民族认同的张力中更具政治功能性。

（责任编辑　张晓梅）

## On Religious Ecology

*Mou Zhongjian*

**Abstract:** Religious Ecology studies the general trend, hierarchical structure, inner and outer relation and dynamic operational mechanism of organic religious cultural systems in different environment from the perspective of cultural ecology. Three major religious systems are examined in the paper: the monotheistic differentiation model of the Abrahamic religions, the monolithic polytheistic transmutation model of Hinduism, and the polynary harmonious interaction system of China. The author will talk about the theoretical value of religious ecology, with an emphasis on the imbalance and recovery of a healthy religious ecology in China.

**Key Words:** Religious Ecology, the Grand Life Perspective, Polynary Harmonious Interaction

## Six Problems in the Religious Discourse of Western Marxism

*Yang Huilin*

**Abstract:** The privatization of religion in modern society has led to an interest in Christianity not only as a faith tradition, but also as a cultural discourse, thus leading to new patterns of discource on the relationship between Christianity and Marxism. Are there possible common grounds of interest for Marxism and Christianity? The question is of significant reference importance for contemporary religious studies in China. The author discusses the issue in six aspects in the paper.

**Key Words:** Western Marxism, Christian Theology, Meaning Structure, Theoretical Paradigm

## Smash Temples, Burn Books: Comparing Secularist Projects in India and China

*Peter van der Veer*

**Abstract:** The paper discusses problems inherent in the secularist project, by an examination of secularisms in India and China. Different motives, historical backgrounds, political situations and cultural considerations etc. have led to different paths and results in the two countries' secularization efforts in modern times, the study of which will further our understanding of the secularist project.

**Key Words:** Secularist Project, India, China, Secularism

## Religion and the Modern Transformation of Charity in China: Also on the Value of Compassion, Tolerance, Specialized Dedication and Formative Education

*Wang Zhenyao*

**Abstract:** The close relationship between religion and charity is widely recognized. In the historical process as charity in China goes through a modern transformation, it is of great importance for the development of charitable works to foster good relation and virtuous circles of interaction between religion and charity, based on the practical situation in China. The author talks about issues including historical origin of religion and charity, compassion and tolerance, and the connection between religious charity and charitable welfare services in a modern society, emphasizing the value of compassion, tolerance, specialized dedication and formative education. It is proposed that social ideas should be